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The Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence at
the Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to provide an overview of the
decisions which have shaped the United States Supreme Court's
position concerning the admissibility of victim impact evidence at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The recent change in the
Court's position will be examined as well as the possible future de-
velopments regarding the admissibility of such evidence.
The capital' trial is conducted in two stages: the guilt trial, in
which the jury rules as to whether the defendant is guilty of the
capital offense, precedes the penalty phase, in which the jury or
judge, following a guilty verdict, must decide whether the defend-
ant should receive a sentence of life imprisonment or death.2 One
similarity transcending most jurisdictions' death penalty statutes
is that prior to the handing down of a sentence mandating either
execution or life imprisonment, a sentencing authority must con-
sider specified "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors relevant to
the defendant's crime or character.3
The penalty trial is intended to serve two purposes: (1) to en-
courage rationality in the sentencing process by requiring the sen-
tencing authority to carefully weigh competing factors prior to sen-
tencing4 and (2) to supply the jury with information concerning
1. A capital case or crime is defined as "[o]ne in or for which death penalty may, but
need not necessarily, be imposed." Black's Law Dictionary 209 (West, 6th ed 1990).
2. Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties: An Examination of the
Modern System of Capital Punishment at 73 (The University of Michigan Press, 1991).
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238
(1972), most states' capital trials were conducted in one single proceeding in which the jury
decided upon both the defendant's guilt as well as his penalty. White, The Death Penalty in
the Nineties at 73.
3. Id. Also common among jurisdictions' penalty proceedings is that the defendant
is given a wide opportunity to introduce "mitigating" evidence concerning his character or
the circumstances of the crime which is consistent with Lockett v Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978).
A majority of jurisdictions authorize a sentence of death only if the mitigating circum-
stances of the crime are outweighed by its aggravating circumstances. White, The Death
Penalty in the Nineties at 73 (citations omitted).
4. Id at 73-74. It was hoped that this procedure would provide the guidance neces-
sary in order for a sentencing authority to make a discretionary judgment which is not arbi-
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the defendant that would likely have been excluded as prejudicial
during the guilt trial because it was not materially relevant to the
issue of guilt.' Additionally, the issues to be resolved during the
penalty trial are quite different from those which are decided dur-
ing the guilt phase.6 With the ultimate goals of the penalty trial
being the utilization of all relevant information in order to facili-
tate the imposition of more accurate death sentences, it was hoped
that the jury would be more thoroughly informed about the cir-
cumstances of the offense as well as the defendant's personal
characteristics.7
The notion of individualized sentencing was introduced and ex-
plained by the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v North
Carolina.8 The Court in Woodson emphasized the qualitative dif-
ference between a sentence of death and one of imprisonment.'
The Court stated that ". . . in capital cases the fundamental re-
spect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . re-
quires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a con-
stitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the pen-
alty of death."10
Gregg v Georgia," decided on the same day as Woodson, inter-
preted Furman v Georgia"s as requiring that the death penalty not
trary or capricious. Id at 73.
5. Id at 74. This was intended to remedy the problem of a sentencing authority not
having the relevant information necessary to enable them to make a sentencing decision. Id.
Because the defendant's guilt was the focus of trials before Furman, the evidence admitted
which was relevant to the penalty was limited. Id.
6. Id at 75. The guilt phase requires the jury to answer questions concerning the
conduct of the accused based upon objective determinations concerning the facts which are
relevant to the crime. Id. In contrast, while the penalty phase does involve some determina-
tions of objective facts, the jury will likely be called upon to render certain value judgments
concerning the mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant on his behalf. Id. Addi-
tionally, recall that the penalty phase requires the jury to weigh certain aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Id.
7. Id at 74.
8. Id at 5.
9. Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 305 (1976).
10. Woodson, 428 US at 304 (citations omitted). The Court ultimately held a North
Carolina Statute which imposed a mandatory sentence of death for certain crimes as viola-
tive of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id at 305.
11. 428 US 153 (1976).
12. 408 US 238 (1972). The Court in Furman granted certiorari to decide whether the
imposition and subsequent carrying out of the death penalty in the cases at issue rose to the
level of cruel and unusual punishment thus violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Furman, 408 US at 239. In the three cases under review, the death penalty was
imposed in two of them for rape and in the remaining one for murder. Id. The Court ulti-
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be imposed utilizing sentencing procedures that allow a ". . .sub-
stantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner.' 1 3 In order to meet the requirements of Furman, the
Court advised that a separate sentencing proceeding be conducted
in order to provide the sentencing authority with both the infor-




II. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
The sentencing phase of a trial is a vehicle through which the
victim of a crime can be permitted to participate in the criminal
justice system.15 Victim participation in the sentencing process can
be accomplished in a variety of ways. 6 Use of a victim impact
statement is a common way in which a victim can become involved
in the sentencing phase of a trial.17
When determining whether victims should actively participate in
the sentencing process, the goals of sentencing and their relation-
ship to victim participation must be considered.' The four pur-
poses of sentencing, as announced by Congress, are: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.1 9 It has been con-
mately concluded that imposing and carrying out the death penalty in these cases would
result in a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id at 239-40.
13. Gregg, 428 US at 188. The Gregg Court viewed Furman to require that the dis-
cretion which is given to a-sentencing authority as to whether to impose the death penalty
must be "suitably directed and limited" to result in lessening the risk that the action taken
would be arbitrary and capricious. Id at 189. The Court noted the established practice of
sentencing which requires consideration of the circumstances of the offense along with the
character of the accused. Id (citation omitted).
14. Id at 195.
15. Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sen-
tencing Decision, 36 UCLA L Rev 199 (1988). Such participation is one response to the
growing concern in recent years for the rights of crime victims. Comment, 36 UCLA L Rev
at 199.
16. Id at 200. Official recognition that victims must be informed of the scheduling of
a convicted defendant's sentencing hearing and requiring restitution to compensate victims
who experience financial losses are examples of two of the ways in which a victim can take
an active role in the sentencing process. Id.
17. Id. A victim impact statement is a statement which describes the impact which a
crime has had upon the victim and the victim's family. Id. Four basic types of information
are provided to the sentencing authority by a victim impact statement:
the circumstances surrounding the crime and the manner in which the crime was
perpetrated, the identity and characteristics of the victim, the effects of the crime on
the victim and the victim's family, and the victim or victim's family's opinion of the
defendant and of an appropriate sentence.
Id at 203.
18. Id at 211 (citation omitted).
19. Id citing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 USC § 3553(a)(2) (Supp IV
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tended that each of these goals can be furthered by victim partici-
pation; the type of participation, however, is different in each
instance.2"
There are two models of retribution: state-initiated retribution
and victim-initiated retribution. 21 The state-initiated model, which
is based upon the state standing in the place of the victim in pros-
ecuting the offender, is further broken down into two models:
moral retribution and social retribution.22 Under the moral model
of retribution, which allows society to punish those who break the
law on the basis that criminal activity is morally wrong, a victim's
moral standing would be subject to study, and thus this model is
counterproductive to the goals of victim participation. 23 The social
model of retribution, which allows a defendant to be punished in
order to restore the social balance which the defendant's crime has
upset, is consistent with the theory of victim participation pro-
vided that the focus of the victim's testimony is solely upon the
harm which he has suffered because of the defendant.24 The model
of victim-initiated retribution is characterized by the victim using
the criminal justice system provided by the state in order to retali-
ate against the defendant.25 The goal of victim-initiated retribution
is to reestablish the personal balance between the victim and the
defendant.
26
The goal of deterrence can be furthered as long as victim partici-
pation increases the probability of punishment.2 7 The severity of
the sanction and the certainty of the sanction are the two variables
1986).
20. Comment, 36 UCLA L Rev at 219 (cited in note 15).
21. Id at 212-14.
22. Id.
23. Id at 212, 219. This model requires a comparison of the goodness of society, which
to a certain extent, is represented by the morality of the victim, with the badness of the
defendant. Id at 212. Thus, by participating in sentencing, the morality of the victim is
subject to question. Id. This inquiry into the relative moral standing of the victim may
offend the victim's dignity as well as present an obstacle to furthering the goals of the vic-
tim at sentencing. Id at 213. It is possible that concentrating on the victim's morality will
result in finding fault with the victim and could ultimately lead to imposing a lesser punish-
ment on the defendant than would have resulted if the victim's morality had not been con-
sidered. Id.
24. Id at 214, 219.
25. Id at 214.
26. Id. This type of retaliation would be counterproductive to equality and propor-
tionality in sentencing, which are key concepts upon which determinate sentencing is based.
Id. The goals of standardized and fair sentences seem to be inconsistent with allowing vic-
tim retaliation to serve as the main purpose guiding the sentencing process. Id at 215 n 67.
27. Id at 219.
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which impact upon deterring a potential lawbreaker from commit-
ting a crime.2
The only way that victim participation can further the goal of
incapacitation is if a victim possesses specific knowledge concern-
ing the accused's propensity to commit further crimes.2" If a victim
can give information regarding the defendant's lifestyle and past
criminal activity, a sentencing authority may be able to utilize such
information.3
Finally, the goal of rehabilitating a defendant may also be fur-
thered as long as the defendant would benefit by facing the harm
which he caused the victim or if the sentence allows for the victim
to participate in its implementation.3 '
Even though it can be argued that each of the goals of sentenc-
ing can be furthered by victim participation, there are competing
viewpoints as to the propriety of admitting victim impact state-
ments at the sentencing phase of a trial. It has been suggested that
such statements would have the tendency to be both inflammatory
and prejudicial.3 2 Additionally, because the statements are often
unsubstantiated as well as difficult to rebut, due process concerns
are present for the defendant.33 Contentions that the prosecutor
functions adequately to represent the victim at trial also serve as a
basis upon which critics of the use of victim impact statements
might argue. s4 Finally, an argument grounded in equal protection
could be made on behalf of the defendant.35 This final argument is
28. Id at 215. It is likely that if victim participation increases the severity of a sanc-
tion, it is being increased in an impermissible way. Id. However, if victim participation en-
courages cooperation between the victim and the prosecutor at trial, which in turn could
increase the overall efficiency of the trial process and increase the certainty of punishment,
the goal of deterrence may be furthered. Id at 216.
29. Id at 219.
30. Id at 216-17. This situation should be contrasted with the case in which the vic-
tim does not know the defendant any better than anyone else who can testify as to the
criminal characteristics of the defendant. Id at 217.
31. Id at 219. If it is possible that the defendant may feel remorse for what he has
done, then some of the best evidence of the harm suffered by the victim would come from
the victim impact statement. Id at 218. Additionally, if the victim is to participate in the
implementation of the defendant's rehabilitation, then information provided by the victim
is important to focus upon the relationship between the victim and the defendant as well as
the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Id at 219.
32. Abraham Abramovsky, Victim Impact Statements Revisited, New York Law
Journal 3 (March 31, 1992). It was reasoned that this would be true because it could be
justifiably presumed that a victim or a victim's family would want the maximum sentence
allowed by law to be imposed upon a defendant. Abramovsky, NY L J at 3.
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rooted in the notion that all victims are entitled to equal justice
and that sentencing should not depend on the position of the vic-
tim as determined from a victim impact statement that can easily
be manipulated by external factors, but upon the severity of the
crime.
3 6
A contrasting viewpoint to the opinion that victim impact state-
ments should not be admitted at the sentencing phase of a trial
emphasizes that allowing victims to participate in the criminal jus-
tice system through the use of victim impact statements could re-
sult in empowering victims.3 7 Moreover, the criminal justice pro-
cess may itself benefit by promoting victim cooperation with a
prosecutor .3  Additionally, providing judges with more information
concerning a case might translate into an improvement of the
criminal justice process.3 9 Furthermore, in response to the argu-
ment that the prosecutor is a sufficient representative of the victim
at trial, supporters of the use of victim impact statements assert
that the prosecution serves as a representative of the people of the
state and thus may not necessarily share the same viewpoint about
a case as does the victim.40 Finally, the concern of equal protection
should be to assure that all victims have the right to be heard.4
36. Id. It was contended that the effectiveness of the victim impact statement could
be influenced by external factors such as the articulateness of the victim or the victim's
family, the financial ability of the victim or the victim's family to hire private counsel to
prepare the statement, and the possibility that a deceased may have no one to testify con-
cerning the effects which the crime had upon them. Id. This could consequently allow the
position of the victim to influence sentencing rather than the severity of the crime. Id.
37. Maria Imperial, A Contrasting View of Victims' Rights, NY L J at 2 (April 15,
1992). This article was prepared in response to Abraham Abramovsky's article titled "Vic-
tim Impact Statements Revisited" (cited in notes 32-36). Imperial, NY L J at 2.
38. Id (cited in note 37).
39. Id. It was pointed out that it should not be assumed that a maximum sentence
for the defendant would be sought after by the victim or the victim's family. Id. In support
of this contention, a study was cited (Hagan, 1982) which demonstrated that victims partici-
pating in the court process were not as likely to demand severe sentences. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The argument concerning the possibility that a victim's articulateness as well
as a victim's financial position might result in inequal justice can be likewise applied to
defendants. Id. A fear that some defendants may be more articulate than others and may be
able to retain higher priced defense attorneys could also support a denial of equal rights. Id.
Despite the views of the article's author, Imperial cautioned against encouraging victim
participation while at the same time not allowing genuine involvement in the criminal jus-
tice system. Id. The participation must be meaningful in order to be effective. Id. A study
on the use of victim impact statements conducted in the Bronx Supreme Court (Davis, Hen-
ley, Smith 1990) was noted as providing no indications of enhanced feelings of involvement
and satisfaction by victims through the use of victim impact statements. Id.
806
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III. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS BEFORE PAYNE V TENNESSEE
The United States Supreme Court has, in Payne v Tennessee,
4 2
recently changed its position regarding the admissibility of victim
impact evidence in the context of the sentencing phase of a capital
trial. What follows is a brief overview of the cases which have
shaped the Supreme Court's present stance on the admissibility of
such evidence.
A. Booth v Maryland"
The issues raised in Booth v Maryland evidenced the growing
victims' rights movement which had its beginnings in the 1970s."
In Booth, the Supreme Court of the United States, for the first
time, considered the admissibility of victim impact statements at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 5
John Booth had been convicted in a trial by jury of two counts
of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery, and conspiracy to
commit robbery following the robbery and murder of Irvin and
Rose Bronstein.4 A presentence report, which included a descrip-
tion of Booth's background, education, and employment history as
well as his criminal record, was prepared by the State Division of
Parole and Probation."7 As part of the presentence report, a victim
42. US , 111 S Ct 2597 (1991).
43. 482 US 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v Tennessee, 111 S Ct 2597 (1991).
44. Note, Death Knell for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47 Md L Rev 701, 705
(1988).
45. Note, 47 Md L Rev at 705.
46. Booth, 482 US at 497-98. Booth and his accomplice Willie Reid entered the
couple's West Baltimore home with the likely intent to steal money in order to purchase
heroin. Id. Because the couple had the ability to identify Booth, they were bound and
gagged and stabbed numerous times with a kitchen knife. Id at 498. The victims' son discov-
ered their bodies two days later. Id. As a principal in the first degree in Mrs. Bronstein's
murder, Willie Reid was convicted and sentenced to death. Id at 498 n 1.
Booth chose to have a jury, rather than a judge determine his sentence. Id at 498. The
prosecution requested the death penalty. Id.
47. Id. A Maryland statute required that for all felony cases, a presentence report
contain a victim impact statement which detailed the effect which the crime had upon the
victim and his family. Id citing Md Ann Code art 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). The Code specifi-
cally provided that "[in any case in which the death penalty is requested ... a presentence
investigation, including a victim impact statement, shall be completed by the Division of
Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the court or jury before whom the sepa-
rate sentencing proceeding is conducted .... " Id at 498 n 2 citing Md Ann Code art 41, §
4-609(d) (1986). The Code stated that the presentence report shall:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along
with its seriousness and permanence;
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impact statement"8 was prepared utilizing information that was ob-
tained in interviews with the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law,
and granddaughter.49 For the murder of Mr. Bronstein, Booth was
sentenced to death, and for the murder of Mrs. Bronstein, he re-
ceived a sentence of life imprisonment. 50
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a
result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the vic-
tim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the vic-
tim or the victim's family that the trial court requires.
Id at 498-99 citing Md Ann Code art 41, § 4-609(c)(3).
48. The information contained in a victim impact statement, a part of the
presentence report, is obtained from the victim or the victim's family and can either be read
to the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial or testified to in person at the sentencing
by the family members. Booth, 482 US at 499.
49. Id. Comments in the victim impact statement spoke of the victims' personal qual-
ities and the effects of the crime as felt by the couple's family members. Id. Both the son
and daughter stated that they suffered from lack of sleep. Id at 500. In the opinion of the
son, his mother and father were "butchered like animals." Id. The daughter was reminded
of the murders each time she saw a kitchen knife. Id. The victim impact statement pro-
vided, in part, as follows:
[T]he victims' son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-three years and
enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day together. He states that his fa-
ther had worked hard all his life and had been retired for eight years. He describes
his mother as a woman who was young at heart and never seemed like an old lady.
She taught herself to play bridge when she was in her seventies. The victims' son
relates that his parents were amazing people who attended the senior citizens' center
and made many devout friends. (citation omitted)
As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were loving parents and
grandparents whose family was most important to them. Their funeral was the largest
in the history of the Levinson Funeral Home and the family received over one thou-
sand sympathy cards, some from total strangers. (citation omitted)
Id at 500 n 3.
The victim impact statement concluded with the following statement by an official of the
State Division of Parole and Probation:
It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family members
that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still such a shocking, painful, and dev-
astating memory to them that it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is
doubtful that they will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not be
haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved ones were mur-
dered and taken from them.
Id at 500.
50. Id at 501. Booth was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder of Mr. Bron-
stein, both premeditated and felony, and finding that Booth was a principal in the first
degree to that murder, the jury imposed a death sentence. Booth v State, 306 Md 172, 507
A2d 1098, 1103 (1986). Booth was also found guilty of first degree murder in the death of
Mrs. Bronstein and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Booth v State, 507 A2d at 1103.
Booth's accomplice, Willie Reid, was found to be the principal in the first degree in the
murder of Mrs. Bronstein and was thus sentenced to death. Id at n 1.
Booth's claim that the victim impact statement introduced an arbitrary factor into the
808
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
determine whether a capital sentencing jury was prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment l from considering victim impact evidence .
The Supreme Court reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals and
held that the Eighth Amendment does prohibit the consideration
of victim impact evidence by a capital sentencing jury.5 3 The Court
concluded that the information contained in the victim impact
statement was irrelevant in the capital sentencing decision as its
admission created a risk that the death penalty may be applied by
the jury in an "arbitrary and capricious" fashion.54
The Court first considered the evidence concerning the victims'
personal characteristics and the emotional effects which the crime
had upon the family. 5  The Court feared that the admission of
such information could result in the jury not focusing upon the
defendant's background and record and the circumstances of the
crime.56 Emphasizing the nature of the information provided by a
sentencing process was rejected by the Maryland Court of Appeals. Booth, 482 US at 501.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that an important function of the victim impact statement
was to enable the sentencer to understand the full extent of the harm caused by the crime.
Id.
51. The text of the Eighth Amendment is as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." US
Const, Amend VIII.
52. Booth, 482 US at 501-02.
53. Id at 502. The court classified the information contained by the victim impact
statement in Booth into two types: (1) a description of the victims' personal characteristics
and the emotional impact upon the victims' family and (2) the family members' opinions
and characterizations of both the crimes and the defendant. Id.
54. Id at 503. The Court noted that in allowing a jury to impose a death sentence, its
discretion must be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbi-
trary and capricious action." Id at 502 citing Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 189 (1976) (joint
opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens); California v Ramos, 463 US 992, 999
(1983). While factors other than the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's record
and characteristics may be considered by the sentencing authority, it must be assured that
such factors are relevant to the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt."
Booth, 482 US at 502 citing Enmund v Florida, 458 US 782, 801 (1982).
55. Booth, 482 US at 503. The State contended that it was not "arbitrary" for the
sentencing jury to consider such evidence because a "direct, foreseeable" connection existed
between the crime and the harm suffered by the family. Id. Arguing that the victim impact
evidence was a "circumstance" of the crime, the State claimed that the jury's knowledge of
the crime's impact upon the family enabled them to better determine the "gravity or aggra-
vating quality" of the offense. Id at 503-04 citing Brief for Respondent at 21.
The Court, however, emphasized that such information would not likely provide a basis
for the defendant's decision to kill because it was unlikely that the defendant had any
knowledge of such information. Id at 505.
56. Id at 505. The sentencing jury must concentrate on the defendant as a "uniquely
individual human bein[g]." Id at 504 citing Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 304
(1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens). A victim impact state-
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victim impact statement, the Court opined that there was a great
risk that the decision in a capital sentencing proceeding would be
made in an arbitrary manner.6 The Court also noted the danger
that a defendant would be unable to effectively rebut the victim
impact evidence without shifting the focus of sentencing away
from the defendant.58
The second type of evidence considered by the Court was the
opinions of family members and the characterizations of the
crimes. 5 9 While the Court was sympathetic to the loss suffered by
the family, it reasoned that such information could only inflame
the jury and cause its attention to be diverted from the relevant
evidence concerning both the crime and the defendant, thus result-
ing in a departure from the reasoned analysis required in capital
cases. 
0
B. South Carolina v Gathers"'
South Carolina v Gathers reinforced the position taken by the
ment, however, does not concentrate upon the defendant, but upon the victim's character
and reputation and the effect which the crime had upon his family-factors that could be
completely unrelated to an individual defendant's blameworthiness. Booth, 482 US at 504.
The Court notes that it is likely that the defendant will not know his victim or particular
information concerning the victim's family. Id. Additionally, the selection of a victim is
probably not based upon the likely effects which a crime will have upon those close to the
victim. Id.
57. Id at 505. The Court used the articulateness (or lack thereof) of the victim's fam-
ily as an example. Id. In Booth, the victims' family members were articulate and persuasive
in describing the effects which the murders had upon their lives. Id. However, it is possible
that a victim will not have a family or that a victim's family, whose loss and grief are similar
to that suffered by the family in Booth, will be unable to effectively articulate their feelings
for the sentencing jury. Id. The possibility that the imposition of the death penalty will
depend on the articulateness of a victim's family (a factor which is irrelevant to the capital
sentencing decision) provides an example of the danger inherent in allowing a jury to con-
sider this type of information. Id.
58. Id at 506. In cross-examining the declarants, it is unlikely that the defendant
would be able to prove that the family members exaggerated their feelings of loss and grief.
Id. Additionally, the Court was concerned about allowing possible "mini-trials" on the vic-
tim's character which could distract the jury from determining the appropriateness of the
death penalty considering the defendant's background and record and the particular cir-
cumstances of the crime. Id at 507. The Court ultimately concluded that victim's personal
characteristics as well as the emotional impact upon the family of the victim were not per-
mitted to be considered during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Id.
59. Id at 508. The couple's son stated that his parents were "butchered like animals"
and that he "doesn't think anyone should be able to do something like that and get away
with it." Id. The victims' daughter expressed her feelings that those who did this were una-
ble to be rehabilitated. Id.
60. Id at 508-09.
61. 490 US 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v Tennessee, 111 S Ct 2597 (1991).
810
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Supreme Court in Booth regarding the admissibility of victim im-
pact evidence. A jury convicted Demetrius Gathers of murder and
first-degree criminal sexual conduct in the death of Richard
Haynes.2 Gathers was sentenced to death.63 At the sentencing
phase, the prosecutor concentrated his comments on the character
of the victim, primarily his religious nature, which he deduced
from the articles found at the scene of the crime."' The Supreme
Court of South Carolina found that the prosecution's comments
concerning the victim's character were not necessary to enable the
jury to understand the circumstances of the crime and thus re-
versed Gathers' death sentence and remanded to allow a new sen-
tencing proceeding.6 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.8 6
The Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that the
punishment received by the defendant in a death penalty case
must be commensurate with his personal responsibility and moral
guilt.67 The Court compared the statements made by the prosecu-
tion with those contained in the victim impact statement in Booth
62. Gathers, 490 US at 807-08. While sitting on a park bench, Haynes was ap-
proached by Gathers and three other individuals who tried unsuccessfully to initiate conver-
sation with him. Id at 806-07. Gathers and his three companions then beat and assaulted
Haynes, and Gathers later returned and stabbed Haynes with a knife. Id at 807. Haynes had
no formal religious training, but fashioning himself as a preacher, he called himself "Rever-
end Minister." Id. It was his practice to carry with him several bags which contained reli-
gious articles. Id at 807. A tract titled "The Game Guy's Prayer," which emphasized the
importance of being a good sport, was found among several other personal items which were
scattered about at the crime scene. Id. The items found at the scene were admitted into
evidence at the guilt phase of the trial without objection. Id.
63. Id at 806. At the sentencing phase, all of the articles which were admitted at the
guilt phase were readmitted into evidence. Id at 808. While no other evidence was presented
by the State at the sentencing phase, it was the prosecution's closing argument that was at
issue in this case. Id. The prosecutor first emphasized that Reverend Minister Haynes was a
religious person, and then he began to describe the articles which were found strewn about
at the crime scene. Id. He even read the contents of the tract "The Game Guy's Prayer" for
the jury. Id at 808-09. The prosecutor went on to describe Haynes as someone who "took
things as they came along" and that "[h]e was prepared to deal with tragedies that he came
across in his life." Id at 809. Noting that Haynes possessed a voter's registration card, the
prosecutor then went on to refer to Haynes as someone who believed in his community as
well as the United States of America. Id at 809, 810.
64. Id at 808-10.
65. Id at 810 citing State v Gathers, 295 SC 476, 369 SE2d 140, 144 (1988). The
Supreme Court 'of South Carolina reasoned that the remarks made by the prosecutor sug-
gested to the jury that the death sentence should be imposed because of the victim's charac-
ter (ie: that he was a religious man and a registered voter). Id.
66. Gathers, 490 US at 810.
67. Id at 810 citing Enmund v Florida, 458 US 782, 801 (1982). The Court added that
"a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender." Id at 810 citing Tison v Arizona, 481 US 137, 149 (1987).
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and observed that, in substance, the statements made by the pros-
ecution in Gathers were indistinguishable from those made in
Booth."8 The Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, reasoning that the statements made by the prose-
cution could result in a jury imposing the death penalty on the
basis of information which was not known by the defendant and
not instrumental in the defendant's decision to kill. 9
IV. PAYNE V TENNESSEE AND ITS IMPACT
In Payne v Tennessee,70 the United States Supreme Court over-
ruled both Booth v Maryland and South Carolina v Gathers, hold-
ing that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a state from
choosing to allow the admission of victim impact evidence as well
as prosecutorial argument concerning the same.7 1 A jury had con-
victed Pervis Tyrone Payne of two counts of first-degree murder
and one count of assault with intent to commit murder in the first
degree in an incident involving Charisse Christopher, her two-year-
old daughter, Lacie, and her three-year-old son, Nicholas. 2 Payne
introduced the testimony of four witnesses during the sentencing
68. Gathers, 490 US at 811. The statements in both cases concerned the personal
qualities and characteristics of the victim. Id. The only distinction was that the statements
in Gathers were made by the prosecutor, while the statements in Booth were made by the
victims' survivors. Id.
69. Id at 811, 812 relying on Booth v Maryland, 482 US at 505. The State argued that
the statements were admissible because they bore a direct relationship to the circumstances
of the crime. Id at 811. Although the Booth Court did not foreclose the possibility that
victim impact information could be admitted under the above circumstances, the Court in
Gathers found that statements made by the prosecutor went too far. Id. The Court con-
cluded that the reading from the religious tract as well as the comments about the character
of the victim could not be relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Id. Under the circum-
stances, it was unlikely that the defendant was even aware of the contents of materials
which Gathers was carrying when he was assaulted. Id at 812.
70. U.S. , 111 S Ct 2597 (1991), rehearing denied by Payne v Tennessee, US
112 S Ct 28 (1991).
71. Payne, 111 S Ct at 2609, 2611. The Court limited the application of its holding to
evidence and argument which deal with the victim and the impact which the crime had
upon the victim's family; the Court did not purport to extend its holding to apply to evi-
dence supplied by the family of the victim which contains characterizations and opinions
concerning the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentences, as no such evidence was
presented in this case. Id at 2611 n 2.
72. Id at 2601. Payne received the death penalty for each of the murders and a 30-
year prison term for the assault. Id. Charisse Christopher, her two-year-old daughter Lacie,
and three-year-old son Nicholas were the victims of Payne's actions. Id. Charisse and her
two children were each stabbed multiple times with a butcher knife. Id at 2602. Even
though Nicholas sustained several stab wounds which penetrated his body from front to
back, he survived after several hours of surgery and an extensive blood transfusion. Id.
Charisse and Lacie, however, did not survive. Id.
812
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phase of the trial.7" The testimony presented by the State was that
of Charisse's mother, Mary Zvolanek, who testified as to the effects
that the murders had upon Nicholas.7 Although the Supreme
Court of Tennessee labeled the testimony of Mrs. Zvolanek as
"technically irrelevant," it concluded that it was "harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt" because it "did not create a constitutionally
unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty. ''115
To review its holdings in Booth and Gathers that victim impact
evidence providing information about the victim's personal charac-
teristics as well as the effects of. the crime upon the victim's family
cannot be considered at the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 7  The Court
73. Id at 2602. The witnesses on Payne's behalf were his mother and father; Bobbie
Thomas; and Dr. John T. Huston, 'a clinical psychologist who specialized in criminal court
evaluation work. Id. These witnesses emphasized Payne's good, moral character and de-
scribed him as a caring person who was good with children and who had no history of drug
or alcohol abuse. Id at 2602-03.
74. Id at 2603. Mrs. Zvolanek explained how Nicholas cried for his mother and sister
and did not seem to understand why they were no longer there. Id. The prosecutor also
emphasized the long-lasting effects which the crimes would likely have upon Nicholas. Id.
The prosecutor speculated that when Nicholas grew up, he would want to know what hap-
pened to his mother and his sister, and he would want to know what justice was done. Id.
During rebuttal to Payne's closing argument, the prosecutor commented as follows:
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation, people who love
the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you to think about the people
who love Charisse Christopher, her mother and daddy who loved her. The people who
loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who are still here. The brother who mourns for
her every single day and wants to know where his best little playmate is. He doesn't
have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the things that go
into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that that child will
carry forever.
Id.
75. Payne, 111 S Ct at 2604 citing State v Payne, 791 SW2d 10, 18 (1990). Emphasiz-
ing the importance of the comments made by the prosecution during closing argument in
determining Payne's "personal responsibility and moral guilt," the court stated that
[w]hen a person deliberately picks a butcher knife out of a kitchen drawer and pro-
ceeds to stab to death a twenty-eight-year-old mother, her two and one-half year old
daughter and her three and one-half year old son, in the same room, the physical and
mental condition of the boy he left for dead is surely relevant in determining his
"blameworthiness."
Id citing Payne, 791 SW2d at 19.
76. Payne, 111 S Ct at 2604. The Court concluded that two premises formed the
foundation for the decisions in Booth and Gathers: (1) a defendant's "blameworthiness" is
not generally determined by evidence which establishes the effects of the crime upon that
victim or the victim's family, and (2) the only evidence which is relevant in a capital sen-
tencing decision is that evidence which relates to "blameworthiness." Id at 2605. The Court
noted, however, that a determination of the harm caused by the defendant has historically
been relevant in establishing the elements of the offense and its punishment. Id.
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:801
briefly examined the history of criminal sentencing and concluded
that the harm caused by a crime has occupied an important role in
the exercise of a sentencing authority's discretion in the imposition
of sentences. 77 The Court concluded that the Booth decision re-
sulted in the defendant enjoying an unfair advantage in the sen-
tencing phase of a capital trial8.7  Acknowledging the possible diffi-
culty in the defendant's being able to rebut such evidence, the
Court found this argument from Booth unpersuasive. 9
Noting that a large portion of the responsibility for defining
crimes, establishing punishments, and defining procedure rests
with the states, the Court reviewed the Eighth Amendment limita-
tions which have been placed upon the process of imposing the
death penalty for certain crimes.80 The Court viewed victim impact
evidence as merely another manner in which the sentencing au-
thority could be informed as to the specific harm caused by the
77. Id at 2606. The Court noted that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which be-
came effective in 1987, required the consideration of factors which were relevant both to the
defendant's subjective guilt as well as the harm caused by his actions in imposing a sen-
tence. Id at 2605-06. Additionally, the Court remarked that sentencing authorities have al-
ways had the freedom to consider a broad spectrum of information. Id at 2606.
78. Id at 2607. While a defendant is largely unlimited in the mitigating evidence
which he may introduce, the State is not permitted to introduce evidence which would in-
form the jury about the victim or the loss suffered by both the victim's family and society.
Id.
79. Id at 2607. The Court also addressed the concern that victim impact evidence
encourages the imposition of the death penalty upon defendants whose victims were seen as
assets to the community while the opposite is true for those whose victims are viewed as less
important. Id. Using the facts of Gathers as an example, the Court reasoned that such was
not the case, and that victim impact evidence was to be admitted to show that the victim
was a unique, individual human being. Id. Recall that the victim in Gathers was an unem-
ployed, mentally handicapped individual who would likely be perceived by most as someone
who did not make significant contributions to society, but the bottom line was that he was
murdered. Id.
80. Id at 2607-08. In reviewing the limitations, the Court stated that:
[f]irst, there is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be im-
posed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the deci-
sionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's
case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus that the death penalty is
disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from imposing the death
penalty for that offense. Second, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of
any relevant circumstance. that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this
respect, the State cannot challenge the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to
consider any relevant information offered by the defendant.
Id at 2608 citing McClesky v Kemp, 481 US 279, 305-06 (1987). Conscious of these limita-
tions, the Court has allowed the states much latitude in choosing the factors which it deems




crime."1 The Court recognized the danger that without evidence
concerning the specific harm caused by the defendant, the sentenc-
ing authority would not possess all of the information necessary to
impose the proper sentence.82 Using the instant case as an appro-
priate example, the Court contrasted the wide variety of mitigating
evidence presented by Payne with the evidence presented by the
prosecution concerning the impact of the crimes upon the victims'
family. 3 The Court ultimately concluded that it was within a
state's discretion to allow the admission of victim impact evidence
as well as prosecutorial argument concerning the same, stating that
the Eighth Amendment does not establish a per se bar to its ad-
mission.8 4 Additionally, in overruling Booth and Gathers, the
Court rejected Payne's argument based upon stare decisis 5
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Court's decision in Payne, it appears that the
victim of a crime or the victim's family will be given a part in the
sentencing process equally important as that occupied by the
defendant.
The basic tenets of death penalty jurisprudence formed the basis
for the Court's earlier decisions. The Court emphasized that the
decision to impose the death penalty should not be carried out in
an arbitrary or capricious manner and likewise would not allow the
consideration of factors which had no relevance to the personal re-
81. Payne, 111 S Ct at 2608. Rejecting the notion that allowing the admission of
victim impact evidence would result in the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, it was
stated that generally legitimate purposes are served by its admission and that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guards against its use in an unduly prejudicial
fashion. Id.
82. Id at 2608. The majority noted that a state interest was present in balancing the
defendant's mitigating evidence and reinforcing to the sentencing authority that not only is
the defendant to be treated as an individual, but likewise, the victim is a unique individual
whose death impacted both his family as well as society. Id at 2608 citing Booth, 482 US at
517 (J. White, dissenting).
83. Payne, 111 S Ct at 2608-09. Recall that Payne's girlfriend and parents and a
clinical psychologist testified as to Payne's good character, that he was good with children,
and that he did not abuse drugs or alcohol-information not related to the circumstances of
the crimes he committed. Id. The only evidence which detailed the impact of Payne's crimes
that was admitted during the sentencing phase was the testimony of Nicholas' grandmother
that Nicholas missed his mother and sister. Id at 2609. The Court found that allowing the
jury to consider the evidence of harm while also considering the defendant's mitigating evi-
dence was not unfair. Id.
84. Id at 2609.
85. Id at 2611. The Court reasoned that stare decisis was not a command to be ap-
plied mechanically but a principle of policy. Id at 2609-11.
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sponsibility and moral guilt of the defendant. 6 Finding that al-
lowing the admission of victim impact evidence created a great risk
that the capital sentencing decision would be made in an arbitrary
manner, the Court rejected the admission of such evidence.
8 7
While the Court in Payne also considered the prohibition
against arbitrary and capricious action, it emphasized the impor-
tance that the sentencing authority have before it all the necessary
information relevant to the sentencing decision which includes in-
formation detailing the harm caused by the defendant.8 The
Court noted that an important function of victim impact evidence
was to balance the effects of the virtually unlimited mitigating evi-
dence which the defendant was permitted to introduce in his own
behalf.89
An additional concern in admitting victim impact evidence is
that a sentencing authority may be encouraged to impose harsher
punishments upon defendants whose victims were considered as
assets to their community than upon defendants whose victims
were viewed as being perhaps less important." The Payne Court
addressed this concern by emphasizing that the purpose of admit-
ting victim impact evidence is not to promote comparative judg-
ments based upon the perceived worth of the victim but rather to
reinforce the notion of "each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual
human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the com-
munity resulting from his death might be." 9'
In this author's opinion, the Court's decision in Payne v Tennes-
see represents a beneficial change in the Court's death penalty ju-
risprudence. While the focus of sentencing is to be upon the de-
fendant's moral guilt and blameworthiness, sentencing must not be
a one-sided procedure. Although it is necessary for a sentencing
authority to consider fully any mitigating factors presented by the
defense, it is equally important that the other side of the issue be
presented - namely, that the only reason for which the sentencing
process must occur is because the defendant has been found guilty
of causing harm to the victim. The harm caused, however, is often
much broader than that suffered by the victim alone. The effect
which the defendant's actions have upon a victim's family is a
86. Booth, 482 US at 503, 504.
87. Id at 503, 509.
88. Payne, 111 S Ct at 2608.
89. Id.




harm which cannot and should not be ignored.
By allowing the sentencing authority to consider victim impact
evidence, the Supreme Court has enabled the sentencer to become
well informed with respect to both factions which have an interest
in the outcome of the sentencing process. Sentencing must be a
balancing process whereby the effect which the defendant's actions
have had upon the victim or the victim's family must be factored
into the equation. The prohibition against "arbitrary and capri-
cious" imposition of the death penalty is also an added safeguard
which transcends the whole sentencing process.
One can only speculate as to what caused this drastic shift in the
Supreme Court's position in a relatively short period of time. Two
of the justices which formed the majority in Booth were not on the
Court when Payne was decided; in the interim between the Court's
decisions in Booth and Payne, Justices Powell and Brennan were
replaced by Justices Kennedy and Souter. Both Justices Kennedy
and Souter sided with the majority in Payne. Since Booth was a 5-
4 decision and Payne was decided by a 6-3 margin, it is arguable
that the change in the Court's personnel may have been a factor
contributing to its change in position. Justice White is the only
Justice who has not been predictable; while he was part of the
Payne majority and the dissenters in Booth, he was also part of
the majority in South Carolina v Gathers. The other unpredictable
variable is the position which the most recent addition to the
Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, will take regarding the issue of
the admissibility of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase
of a capital trial. It seems, however, that he will not alone be able
to effect another change in this limited facet of the Court's death
penalty jurisprudence. Justice Thomas could either add to the
Payne majority of six or take the place among the dissenters which
Justice Marshall left vacant. Thus, it is not likely that Payne v
Tennessee will be overruled any time in the near future.
Regardless of the reasons for the change in the Court's position,
it is apparent that the rights of the victim are no longer secondary
in importance to those of the defendant. While a court must be
careful not to place the defendant in danger of being subject to
arbitrary and capricious action by a sentencing authority, the sen-
tencer now has the freedom to thoughtfully consider the victim
and the victim's family and the suffering which they have endured
as a result of the defendant's actions. The Supreme Court, in its
decision in Payne, has taken a important and significant step to
recognize the rights of victims in our society. It is a step that may
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pave a pathway for future decisions which likewise will place the
rights of victims on an equal footing as those of the accused.
Christine D. Marton
